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NOTES
A HISTORICAL ESSAY AND ECONOMIC ASSAY OF THE
CAPITAL ASSET DEFINITION: THE TAXPAYER AND
COURTS ARE STILL MINDFULLY GUESSING WHILE
CONGRESS DOESN'T SEEM TO (HAVE A) MIND
Nothing in the nature of things makes separation from capital
one of the requisites of income from capital. From a practical
common-sense point of view there is something strange in the
idea that a man may indefinitely grow richer without ever being
subject to an income tax.
-Thomas R. Powell1
Why does public discussion of economic policy so often show the
abysmal ignorance of the participants?
-Robert M. Solow2
Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not more
SO.
-Albert Einstein 3
Forming new businesses, creating new jobs, providing risk incen-
tives, stimulating economic growth-proponents of a capital gains
tax reduction sound these putative economic benefits amid the
continuing debate concerning the tax status of capital gains.4 Their
political opponents primarily counter with a tax fairness argument:
1. Thomas R. Powell, Income from Corporate Dividends, 35 HARV. L. REV. 363, 376 (1922)
(commenting on Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)).
2. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 2 (3d ed.
1985).
3. Id. at 18.
4. E.g., Jeffrey Bell & John Mueller, Is There a Tax-Cut Path Through This Thorny
Recession?, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1992, at C3; Lee Humphries, Government, Not the
Wealthy, Would Profit from Capital Gains Cut, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 9, 1992, at
13A; Steven Mufson, Bush's Capital Gains Plan Favors Wealthy, Panel Says; Study: 70%
of Tax Benefits Go to Top Earners, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1992, at Dl.
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the principal beneficiary of such tax policy will be the wealthiest
members of our nation.5 The latter's aim, of course, is to create
negative sentiments in the minds of the country's middle- and low-
income taxpayers. Even amidst the political clamor, though, the
unadulterated, nonpartisan economist will acknowledge that lower-
ing the capital gains tax is more akin to a "removal of a penalty"
than to a "special privilege."'6 The heart of this purist economist's
statement is the essence of this Note: formulating the most func-
tional and economically fitting definition of the capital asset itself.
The importance of capital asset taxation extends far beyond po-
litical debate, and the dollar values are indeed significant. Accord-
ing to a recent study, a thirty-percent capital gains tax reduction
could result in a cumulative increase in real gross national product
(GNP) ranging from $7.2 billion to $47 4 billion over the first five
years, depending on the resultant decline in costs of capital.' Gov-
ernmental revenue increases from individual taxpayers alone,
based on the same tax reduction, would reach approximately $7 4
billion during the first three tax years before substantial revenue
losses ensued.8 In 1989, for example, roughly fifteen million indi-
vidual taxpayers generated in excess of $145 billion in net capital
gains.'
To understand the nature of the "capital asset" and some of the
reasoning that supports its historical preferential treatment, con-
sider the following true story Beginning in 1919, an insightful
small-town banker encouraged his tobacco farmer neighbors to in-
vest their "meager savings" in a burgeoning company named Coca-
Cola. 10 As a result, 7,600 residents of Quincy, Florida now own
5. See Bell & Mueller, supra note 4, at C3; Humphries, supra note 4, at 13A; Mufson,
supra note 4, at D11.
6. See Bell & Mueller, supra note 4, at C3.
7. Brien W Cashell & Jane G. Gravelle, Potential Economic Effects of a Capital Gains
Tax Cut, 54 TAX NoTEs 887, 887 (1992).
8. Id. at 887-88. The preliminary "unlocking" of accumulated capital asset appreciation,
known as the "lock-rn" effect, prompted by the advantageous circumstance of lower tax
rates, causes the short-term increase in revenues followed by periods of revenue losses. See
infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
9. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVIcE, PuB. No. 1304, STATISTICS OF INcoE-1989 INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX RETURNS 2 (rev. Sept. 1992).
10. Durwood McAlister, Here's Why Capital Gains Tax Should Be Cut, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Apr. 16, 1992, at As.
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shares of Coca-Cola worth approximately $300 million, which rep-
resents a one thousand-percent increase during the last ten years
alone." This example demonstrates some of the distinctions be-
tween capital asset appreciation and currently earned income. It
also is evidence of the inequities of taxing such appreciation as
current income. Together, these distinctions and inequities have
created a unique perspective relative to the meaning of "capital
asset" and the taxation of associated transactions.
Special tax provisions have applied to capital asset transactions
since 1921.12 Economic policy has been the primary basis for sin-
gling out the capital asset for special treatment. Each of the stan-
dard justifications 3 has its underpinning in the nature of the capi-
tal asset itself. Logically, then, the definition of a capital asset
operates on two levels: first, it separates categories of assets for
differing tax treatment, and second, it operates as the basis for the
differing treatment.
Because preferential taxing provisions have applied to capital
transactions virtually without interruption during the history of
United States income taxation, 4 certainty as to what assets will
receive these preferences is desirable. 5 The form of the prefer-
ences and the extent to which they will be granted are appropri-
ately tied to the generally understood tax policy functions: raising
revenue, effecting certain social purposes, and generating certain
economic outcomes.'" Clearly, if the politics of these functions re-
i1. Id. The dramatic appreciation in value consists of both inflationary and real economic
increases.
12. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233.
13. The typical four rationales are: "income bunching" marked by realization of long-
term appreciation upon sale or exchange; the "lock-in effect," which is a tendency to hold
such assets as a result of income bunching; the effect of inflationary deterioration on long-
term gains; and the possible stimulation of savings, investment, and general economic activ-
ity under appropriate conditions. BORIS I. BiTTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION
OF INCOME. ESTATES AND GiFrs 1 3.5.7 (2d ed. 1981). Each of these economic bases receives
more detailed attention in subsequent sections of this Note.
14. See infra notes 138-62 and accompanying text (providing a historical overview of the
statutory development).
15. The requirement of certainty to prevent unfairness was one of Adam Smith's taxation
maxims. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
778 (Modern Library ed., Random House 1937) (1776).
16. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (5th ed. 1987). For illustrative pur-
poses, consider the social goals behind low-income housing credits and historical building
rehabilitation credits, see I.R.C. §§ 42, 46-47 (1988), and the economic reasons behind the
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sulted in no tax preferences or differential treatment related to
capital transactions, the concern over the definition of the capital
asset would be wasted.
However, assuming the current trend will continue, a clear and
meaningful definition of what assets are to receive graces-or dis-
tinguished handling in any form-is essential. The functions of
taxation may govern the proper measure of special treatment but
should not control the base to which the treatment applies. In-
stead, the capital asset definition must coincide with its economic
nature.i7 Essentially, the extent of special treatment afforded is
the more fluid element; the purpose of separating capital gains and
losses from ordinary gains and losses is the more fundamental,
static concept. The term "static," here, does not imply that the
distinction will never change. The functions and attitudes regard-
ing a given asset indeed do change, but the economic ideas sup-
porting the differences are relatively fixed.'8 The current statutory
definition, although seemingly explicit, has proven to be a disaster
in terms of transforming intent into language.' 9 The statute
strangely provides that select provisions apply to a category of as-
former regular investment credit and the myriad of concessions aimed at small business,
such as bonus depreciation and lenient accounting methods, see td. §§ 179, 448. The func-
tion of revenue raising is self-evident.
17. Referring to income definitions, Professor Robert M. Haig cautioned that should legal
concepts "depart[] in any very fundamental fashion from the economic concept," serious
injustices would occur. Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal As-
pects, in 1 THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (R.M. Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in READINGS IN THE
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 58, 66 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959).
18. The example of land during feudal times in England is helpful here. Viewed in its
fixed quantities, physical use of land was vitally important. Whether farmed, resided upon,
or built upon, it was the ultimate capital asset. Only the detachments of land, i.e., crops,
were appropriately considered income creators. See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying
text.
Today, land is often the subject of speculation and trade, and although investments are
also capital assets, one deriving income from frequent trades in land likely would find the
income categorized as ordinary because the land's status has changed to that of inventory.
See infra notes 101-108 and accompanying text. Throughout this example, the economic
theories supporting the classifications have remained constant.
19. The intended meaning is generally understood to have been roughly equal to the eco-
nomic substance of the capital asset. See infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text. The
written result, however, does not convey such meaning in all respects, thus causing courts
much discontent. See infra notes 173-211 and accompanying text.
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sets, which it defines as everything except for five exclusions.2
Commentators have criticized this inverted, circuitous approach
intensely, blaming it for the courts' failure to develop a "coherent,
consistent standard. 21 The courts have run the gamut from trying
judicially to provide decisions supporting the economic nature of
the capital asset to simply deferring to the statute.2
This Note addresses what the proper definition of the capital
asset should be in light of its economic substance and the economic
purposes of our revenue system. First, an introduction to early no-
tions of income provides a feel for the economic essence of the cap-
ital assets because our ideas of what constitutes capital assets
originated largely in these early conceptions of income.13 Thereaf-
ter a more academic treatment of the economic foundation, fol-
lowed by a historical dialogue of the statutory development, allows
for analysis of the current state. This Note then explores judicial
decisions based on the reasoning behind truncating a special group
of assets. It concludes by recommending a legislative adoption of a
fairer and more workable definitional representation of the capital
asset's economic core.
PRELUDE: WHAT IS INCOME?
24
This section primarily tracks the development of the legal con-
cept of income as related to the capital asset in the United States.
20. The five exclusions are inventory, depreciable and real property used in a business,
trade receivables, copyrights, and certain government publications. See infra notes 164-72
and accompanying text.
21. E.g., Glenn C. Shrader, Note, Broad Reading of Corn Products Doctrine Rejected:
Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 42 TAX LAW. 357, 368 (1989).
22. See infra notes 173-211 and accompanying text.
23. The following editorial statements appeared in the New York Times in 1921: "The
economic distinction between capital and income is one of natural law, independent of ei-
ther statutes or Constitutions," Taxation of Capital Gains, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 15, 1921, at 8,
quoted in Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law
Got to Do with It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869, 877 (1985); and "It may be right to tax profits as profits,
but it cannot be right to tax capital as income, nor can capital be made income by statute,"
Trading and Taxing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1921, at 10, quoted in Kornhauser, supra, at 877
n.46.
24. A myriad of theories concerning "what is income" exist. In the widely accepted view
of Henry Simons, income is an algebraic summation of the value of everything a person
consumes, plus his net increase or decrease in personal wealth as determined both by addi-
tions/deletions and changes in value. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC Fi-
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The English Beginnings
The need for a legal definition of income originated in England
and continental Europe because of the entailed" system of land
ownership. 2 These countries developed legal concepts that defined
capital as the physical estate and income as the separable product
of the estate.2 7 In distinguishing between what belonged to the
body or corpus of the estate and what the tenant could consume,
the courts could not consider an entailed estate to be saleable.2
Changes in the value of the estate had virtually no impact on
wealth because of this restraint on alienation.29 Wealth was a func-
tion of regularly recurring and reasonably expected gains, detached
from any capital value.30
With the advent of the London Stock Exchange in 1773, com-
merce in securities and bonds rose dramatically 31 Instead of being
regarded as a "value," however, a security was regarded as "a res, a
thing." 2 A rise or fall in price, therefore, did not alter the invest-
ment itself "and was not an element of income."3 " Further, the re-
alization of a change in value upon disposition was merely an ac-
cretion or declination of capital.34 Though these concepts largely
NANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 164-65 (1959). Irving Fisher's conception of income is
not so well accepted as Simons' It considers only consumption and ignores changes in
wealth and amounts saved indefinitely until finally consumed. JOHN F DUE & ANN F
FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 354 (5th ed. 1973).
In a tax system, the Fisher approach would make revenue estimation a virtual impossibility.
25. "Entailed" is defined as "[s]ettled or limited to specified heirs." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 530 (6th ed. 1990).






31. See id. at 27. Before 1773, stocks and bonds were sold in England only to a limited
extent: "[T]hey were only a tiny and unrepresentative fraction of accumulated private
wealth." Id.
32. Id. ("The capital investment was not the quantity of money that had been paid for
the [security] or its market value, but the [security] itself.").
33. Id. The capital asset is held for its production of income, not its inherent value;
changes in the capital asset's value do not alter the owner's position because to dispose of
the asset and remain in his same position, he would need the same amount of proceeds to
buy the same or similar good. Id. at 48.
34. Id. at 27.
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continue in Europe today, England developed a tax system that
could reach the capital gain.35
The Agrarian Influence
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, economists de-
veloped formal concepts of income that hinged upon agricultural
proceeds.3 " We owe to our agrarian past the idea of a fixed, produc-
ing source and an independent, expendable sum that detaches
from, but does not diminish, its source.37 Notions of regularity and
periodicity, as applied to income, are related easily to economic
pursuits such as farming.3 The most salient of these features is
certainly the element of periodicity-the tendency to occur at reg-
ular intervals.39
Outside this periodic realm of income lay those gains attributa-
ble to defined occurrences.4 ° Examples include sales of property,
gifts, inheritances, or other windfalls. The expectation of any re-
currence obviously did not apply to these items.4' "A prudent man
will therefore regard them differently from ordinary income.
He will treat them as additions to his capital, not available for or-
dinary consumption." '42 As defined under this approach, capital
gains encompassed all irregular, unexpected receipts.43
American Development
Although the economy of the early United States was largely ag-
ricultural, land was much more available and easily acquired than
in England. 4 Transfer of ownership occurred more frequently and
profit from such activities was more common." Therefore, al-
35. Id. at 28-29. Great Britain began taxing capital gains during the 1960s; Canada began
taxing capital gains in 1972. DuE & FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 24, at 261.








44. Id. at 29-30.
45. Id. With a focus shifting toward the purchaser's intent in ownership and transfer, the
departure from the res theory and early notions of the capital asset had begun. Id. at 31.
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though America borrowed heavily from the English common law
and regarded capital investments as res, Congress expressly in-
cluded gains to such capital in income for tax purposes in the Rev-
enue Act of 1862.46
Problems with taxing unchartered territory were immediately
evident. For example, the Civil War Income Tax Act of 186741 pro-
vided that assessment of taxes on gains and income would occur
"annually "48 Based on the inclusion of the word "annually," the
Supreme Court in Gray v. Darlington49 ruled that only accretion
occurring in the tax year of sale was taxable. 50 The result was that
none of the $20,000 accruing on a bond held for four years was
taxable. 51 The Court came to this conclusion despite an 1867
amendment 52 to the Revenue Act of 18641" deleting the word "an-
nual" from the general definition of the tax base.
Congress further relaxed the idea of limiting taxation to a cer-
tain period of accretion by enacting the Corporation Excise Tax
Act of 1909.5" A 1918 Supreme Court interpretation of the Act dis-
The nature of the physical asset, versus the value represented, presumes the intent of the
owner for purposes of determining the asset's classification. The owner of a capital asset will
want to reinvest the proceeds and restore his previous capital position. Id. at 48-49. Inten-
tions in a modern economy vary greatly, so that ideally the individual holder determines the
classification of assets held.
46. Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473. The first income tax act passed
in 1861, Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, §§ 49-51, 12 Stat. 292, 309-11 (repealed 1862), was
repealed by the 1862 Act, and never went into effect.
47. Civil War Income Tax Act of 1867, ch. 169, 14 Stat. 471.
48. Id. § 13, 14 Stat. at 478.
49. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63 (1872).
50. Id. at 66-67.
51. Id. at 64-67; see infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing realization and
recognition concepts).
52. Ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. at 477-78. Prior to the amendment, the statute stated "[tihat
there shall be levied annually upon the annual gains, profits, or income of every person
a duty." Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 116, 13 Stat. 223, 281 (emphasis added).
53. Ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223.
54. Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112. The Revenue Act of
1870, ch. 255, 16 Stat. 256, defined income in substantially the same manner as the Act of
1867 and was the last of the Civil War tax laws.
After the income tax provisions of the 1870 Act expired in 1871, ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. at
257, Congress did not again impose an income tax until 1894. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, §
27, 28 Stat. 509, 553. This Act broadly taxed the "gains, profits, or income from any
kind of property, rents, interest, dividends, or salaries or from any other source
whatever." Id. The Supreme Court, however, ruled the Act unconstitutional as a direct tax
violating the constitutional requirement of apportionment. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
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missed the contention that realized appreciation in property values
represented a rise in the value of capital assets and not taxable
gain.55 The Court reasoned:
The suggestion that the entire proceeds of the conversion should
be still treated as the same capital, changed only in form and
containing no element of income although including an incre-
ment of value, we reject at once as mconsistent With the general
purpose of the act. Selling for profit is too familiar a business
transaction to permit us to suppose that it was intended to be
omitted from consideration in an act for taxing the doing of bus-
iness in corporate form upon the basis of the income received
"from all sources." 6
This reasoning is consistent with an earlier decision, Stratton's In-
dependence, Ltd. v. Howbert,57 which also involved a broad under-
standing of income: " '[I]ncome' may be defined as the gain de-
rived from capital, from labor, or from both combined "5S
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 605-07 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.4), aff'd on reh'g, 158 U.S.
601 (1895). The Sixteenth Amendment removed the apportionment requirement. U.S.
CONST. amend. XVI.
55. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 187-88 (1918). This decision was one of
three "Capital Gains Cases" that the Supreme Court handed down on the same day. The
other two cases were United States v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway,
247 U.S. 195 (1918), and Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co., 247 U.S. 189 (1918). The Court
ruled in both instances that net accretion on the sale of property was recognizable income.
Cleveland, 247 U.S. at 196; Hays, 247 U.S. at 193.
56. Doyle, 247 U.S. at 183. The interpreted act was an excise-or privilege-tax provision,
not an income tax provision. Because the excise tax was measured by income, however, the
excise-income tax distinction likely did not affect the Court's theory of what was to be in-
cluded in income. In characterizing the sale as a "familiar business transaction," id.
(emphasis added), the Court indicated that it may have been influenced by the corporate
status of the taxed entity.
The idea that corporations always have a "one track" business profit purpose indicates a
presumed profit motive for corporate and business tax determinations; this belief or mode of
operation is present in our current tax system. See I.R.C. § 162 (1988) (defining trade or
business expenses). Court decisions considering whether purpose, motive, or intent relating
to a sale is important in the income context may assist in determining whether such notions
should be considered in an ordinary versus capital gain determination. See, e.g., infra notes
179-210 and accompanying text (explaining the contrast between Corn Products Refining
Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (finding that corn futures are inventory, not capital
assets), and Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988) (holding that moti-
vation for investment is irrelevant in determining the existence of a capital asset)).
57. 231 U.S. 399 (1913).
58. Id. at 415.
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The Sixteenth Amendment
Interpretations of the Sixteenth Amendment 5 firmly entrenched
the taxation of capital gains into the United States tax system.
The first act passed under the amendment became effective March
1, 1913,60 and was the advent of our present income tax laws. Dur-
ing 1920 and 1921, the Supreme Court firmly pronounced that
"income" under the tax law included capital gains. In Eisner v.
Macomber,6 the majority acquiesced to the famous definition of
income in Stratton's Independence6 2 but stipulated that "it be un-
derstood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of
capital assets. '63
Judicial interpretation also doomed the occasional buyer or
seller. Reasoning that any other ruling would undermine the Six-
teenth Amendment's meaning of "income" and its grant of taxing
power, the Court in Merchant's Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka"4
59. The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1913, reads: "The Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI.
For discussion of the constitutional restrictions on the taxing powers of the federal and
state governments, see DUE & FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 24, at 243-47.
60. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 166. The Act defined net income as
follows:
That, subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter al-
lowed, the net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and in-
come derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service of
whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, busi-
nesses, trade, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or per-
sonal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal
property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of
any lawful business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income
derived from any source whatever
Id. § II, 38 Stat. at 167.
61. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
62. See supra text accompanying note 58.
63. Eisner, 252 U.S. at 207. In addition, the Supreme Court affirmed on constitutional
grounds that realization was a necessary prerequisite to taxing such gains. Id. In describing
realization, the Court noted that "severfance] from the capital" and availability for "sepa-
rate use, benefit and disposal" were elements of "income derived from property." Id.
The court subsequently construed "attainment" of realization quite liberally. See, e.g.,
Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S. 347, 349-50 (1918) (deciding that realization need not be in
money but could occur upon receipt of any exchangeable property).
64. 255 U.S. 509 (1921).
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found that, in terms of income, the gain from a single, isolated sale
of property was no different from profits arising from repeated
sales by one engaged in such business.6 5 In light of these and other
Court decisions, Congress' power to tax capital gains clearly was
affirmed. Congressional dominion in this area is virtually limitless:
capital gains may be taxed fully, at reduced rates, or not at all."
Realization, Lock-in, and Capital Transactions
Although the Internal Revenue Code does not explicitly include
a requirement of realization prior to taxing gains,6 7 the concept is
entrenched in our system." Aside from judicial acknowledgment, 9
65. Id. at 520. To be consistent with the legislative history, however, tax treatment of real
and personal property transactions would have to differ. In congressional discussion of the
Act of 1913, Congressman Hull spoke of reporting both gains and losses on securities trans-
actions, but "as to an occasional purchase of real estate not by a dealer , this bill would
only apply to profits on sales where the land was purchased and sold during the same year."
J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861, at
991 (1938).
66. The Supreme Court has curtailed only the power to tax unrealized gains. Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1918). One member of the Court considered removing even
this limitation. Justice Douglas, reconsidering the question presented in Towne of whether
stock dividends were income, declared that treating an increase in wealth measured by the
earnings supporting the stock dividend as income would be within Congress' power. Helver-
Ing v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 409-10 (1943) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
67. Section 61(a)(3) provides for the inclusion of "[glains derived from dealings in prop-
erty." I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (1988). This section arguably requires "dealings" in property before
taxing any gain but is void of any explicit exclusion of unrealized appreciation.
68. Interpreting the Revenue Act of 1913, the Supreme Court implied a requirement of
realization, enunciating a now-famous definition of income:
"Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined," provided it be understood to include profit gained through a
sale or conversion of capital assets
[T]he essential matter [is]: not a gain accruing to capital, not a growth
or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of
exchangeable value proceeding from the property, severed from the capital
and coming in, being "derived"
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S.
179, 185 (1918)). Four equally famous cases adjusted the income definition, quickly eroding
this requirement. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (find-
ing no exclusion for the taxation of punitive damages, restricting Eisner to its facts, and
adding "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion" to the definition of gross income); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116
(1940) (referring to "the rule that income is not taxable until realized" as one of "adminis-
trative convenience"); Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940) (holding that a landlord
realized a gain on lessee's capital improvement upon repossession) (statutorily reversed by
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allusion to the notion is implicit in the statutes. For instance, in
computing gains and losses from property dispositions, section
1001 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for recognition of
gains and losses "on the sale or exchange of property, 7 0 implying
that mere increases and decreases in property value are not ac-
counted for during accrual, but only upon realization by a taxable
event.71
From an economic theorist's viewpoint, however, a widely ac-
cepted concept of income recognizes all regular, irregular, ex-
pected, and unexpected accretions or diminutions to wealth. 2 The
formulation of measurement under this approach is to combine all
consumption with the net change in wealth, which is the sum of
the market value of all assets and liabilities. 3 Uniquely, this
method is unconcerned with realization and succinctly accounts for
depreciation automatically because the overall change in wealth
will reflect value changes in assets, whether from wear and tear or
otherwise. 4 As is obvious, though, the primary critique is practical
administration. Valuation without sale, disregarding realization, in-
deed may be imprecise and costly 71
Several propositions, though, militate for the economic theorist's
position or similar viewpoints. Assuming that valuation absent re-
alization is not pragmatic and that capital gains are ignored until a
I.R.C. § 109); United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1931) (holding that a
corporation realized income when it purchased its own bonds at less than issue price).
69. See supra notes 55, 63, 68 and accompanying text.
70. I.R.C. § 1001(c).
71. Supporting the implication is the computation of the gain or loss itself-generally the
excess of the amount received over the cost of the property adjusted for depreciation. Id. §
1001(a). The calculation makes no mention of any previously recognized increase or decrease
in value or basis adjustment for the same.
72. MUSGRAVE, supra note 24, at 165; see supra notes 24-58 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing income theories).
73. MUSGRAVE, supra note 24, at 165.
74. Id. at 165-66. Except for its inclusion of depreciation in its calculations, this method
conflicts with several accounting purposes. For example, both the cash and accrual account-
ing methods attempt to incorporate a measure of realization to indicate properly the timing
of revenues. Id. at 166. Reporting all changes in value results in a loss of the measure of
business performance. The function of reliability may also be distorted. Despite criticisms of
historical cost, it does maintain certainty, whereas the constant revaluation of assets invites
a degree of arbitrariness. Id. at 166-67.
75. DuE & FitIEDLAENDER, supra note 24, at 266; MUSGRAVE, supra note 24, at 166-67.
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taxable event, those who choose not to enter a taxable event76 will
be favored with untaxed appreciation. 7  Although this state of
waiting is seemingly advantageous, the disincentive it creates,
known as "lock-in," offends the natural decision to enter into capi-
tal transactions.7  The market would operate more efficiently if
such drastic tax alternatives were not available to influence the de-
cision whether to buy, sell, or hold an asset.
To prevent such obstruction of the decisionmaking process, the
elimination of capital transactions taxation is an alternative to
continually taxing appreciation.7 9 Such a policy seems unfair, how-
ever, considering that capital gains statistically make up a more
significant portion of large incomes than small incomes.8 0 Without
a restructuring of the tax system, then, the effect of removing capi-
tal gains taxes would be to shift more of the tax burden to those
76. Of course, not all dispositions are subject to choice. For example, owners do not nor-
mally will condemnation, destruction, and theft of their property. These situations are ac-
commodated with some limitations by certain rollover, nonrecognition provisions in the
Code. See I.R.C. § 1033 (1988).
Tax laws afford similar treatment to certain other voluntary transactions, such as like-
kind exchanges and the sale and replacement of one's principal residence. See id. §§ 1031-
1032, 1034-1043; see also id. § 1091 (concerning the postponement of "paper" losses from
wash sales of securities).
77. MUSORAVE, supra note 24, at 167.
78. DAVID G. DAvIEs, UNrED STATES TAXES AND TAX POLICY 105 (1986). Scholars often
advocate preferential capital gains treatment simply because it mitigates this effect, thus
reducing the impediment to the capital markets. DUE & FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 24, at
260, 262, 264.
One proposal aimed solely at alleviating the lock-in effect also meshes with the original
conception of a capital asset. The proposal would allow rollover treatment of capital gains
that are reinvested, probably within certain guidelines. Id. at 266; see supra note 76
(describing some existing rollover provisions). This handling jibes with the true nature of
the capital asset because it considers the asset itself of utmost import and does not treat
accretions to capital as true income; the owner's reinvestment of the sale proceeds exempli-
fies the import of the physical asset. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the res theory of capital and early conceptions of capital and income).
79. MUSGRAVE, supra note 24, at 167.
80. "Whereas capital gains constitute one half of 1 percent of the income of persons with
incomes from $5,000 to $10,000, they constitute 10% in the $50,000 to $100,000 range, 25%
in the $100,000 to $500,000 range, and 51% in the $500,000 to $1,000,000 group." DUE &
FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 24, at 263. Although these figures represent 1964 data, the alloca-
tion and distribution is clear.
Some describe this situation as vertical equity, or rather, "inequity." MUSGRAVE, supra
note 24, at 160, 167. Many social ramifications, such as whether the wealthy should pay a
greater percentage of taxes, and whether wealth redistribution is consistent with a capitalist
society, relate to this principle.
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with less ability to pay Of course, the U.S. tax law has generally
taken an approach that provides some preference to capital gains.8 1
Many other proposals run the gamut between the ideal and the
pragmatic. Some of the more noteworthy include valuation-but
only at specified intervals-and an accounting of net capital gains
at death taxable upon settling the estate.82 A more easily adminis-
tered approach involves proration, which would allow taxation on
gains at the taxpayer's marginal rate based on the length of time
he held the property 83 Finally, the most idealistic procedure would
average total income during a significant period, conceivably even
one's lifetime, thereby eliminating all irregularities and fluctua-
tions associated with any earnings.8
Each of these attempts, too, bears obvious administrative diffi-
culties or inequities, but certainly no one can honestly assert that
our present tax system is a model of convenience, clarity, or fair-
ness. Still, the question of how to treat capital transactions is only




Economic Attributes of the Capital Asset
Many of the arguments for preferential treatment of capital
gains, or their exclusion from taxation altogether, arise from cer-
Perhaps the more palatable ideology is horizontal equity. Although horizontal equity can
be rooted in the "ability to pay," its fundamental tenet is to treat people in equal positions
equally. Id. at 160.
81. 'See infra notes 138-62 and accompanying text (discussing the development of statu-
tory provisions related to capital gains); infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the current tax treatment of capital gains and losses).
82. MUSGRAVE, supra note 24, at 167.
83. DUE & FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 24, at 267. For example, a share of stock held for
eight years is sold and the owner realizes $80 in capital gain. Ten dollars, one eighth of that
gain (one divided by the number of years held), would be taxed at the seller's marginal rate.
84. Id. at 267-68. Although the record-keeping under such a procedure would be signif-
icant, it would not necessarily be unmanageable assuming a manageable period of
time-possibly five, six, or even eight years. Id. The result would be an effective solution to
problems relating to "bunching," drawing distinctions between capital and ordinary income,
and the erratic nature of capital gains and losses; however, the idea provides minimal relief
from the lock-in effect. Id.
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tamn economic attributes associated with the essence of the capital
asset. 5 Unlike most kinds of income, capital gains accrue sporadi-
cally and without certainty86 One generally will not consider capi-
tal gains a reliable source of income;87 in fact, because capital
losses occur with just as much irregularity, gains are commonly
perceived as accretions to capital that are not available as disposa-
ble income.8
Furthermore, capital assets characteristically derive their worth
from the income calculated to be produced by them.8 9 Thus, taxing
capital gains arguably amounts to double taxation in effect. An in-
crease in the capital asset's value suggests an increase in the in-
come the asset is expected to produce.90 Therefore, to tax the in-
come when received and then to tax the rise in market value that
is only a reflection of expectations results in taxation times two.91
The realization of the "expectations" upon sale, of course, replaces
the promise of the increased future income related to that particu-
lar asset, but subsequent reinvestment would reinstate the income
stream.92
Although capital gains and losses by definition are occasioned by
price changes, to distinguish between independent changes in price
85. One basic concept, that capital gains represent growth in the asset and not separable
income, is the res theory discussed supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
86. DUE & FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 24, at 260, 262; SELTZER, supra note 26, at 8, 10, 47.
Of course, one might argue that all profits are uncertain, see id. at 79-81, but capital gains
and ordinary profits differ in the extent to which one can control them. To illustrate, a
factory operating to produce widgets (and ordinary profits) may exert control over manage-
ment, methods, capacity, labor, and so on to impact profits. In addition, numerous influ-
ences beyond the control of management-general economic conditions, government regula-
tion, natural disaster, competition-affect profits. The uncertainty related to capital gains is
a condition of these external influences; the taxpayer has less control over capital gains than
over ordinary profits.
87. Economic theory attempts to account for the "motivation, rewards, and behavior of
business enterprises and consumers"; expected net income should be classified as ordinary
because of its attraction of our resources and because its disposal will not reduce overall
capital. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 47.
88. The result is that decisions to consume or save will differ according to the nature of
the income. DUE & FRiEDLAENDER, supra note 24, at 260; SELTZER, supra note 26, at 10.
89. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 10.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 19.
92. Id. at 10.
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and changes in the general price level" is very important."4 The
latter changes do not represent real changes; the increase or de-
crease is illusory because of inflation or deflation.95 Thus, real capi-
tal gains and losses are only those shifts in value, excluding general
price level alterations, that constitute true economic power en-
hancements or diminutions. In practice, real and unreal capital
gains and losses generally are not distinguished.9"
Moreover, most capital gains represent appreciation covering
long periods of time, usually more than one year.97 The treatment
of such gains as income in the current year of realization creates a
higher total tax burden.98 This phenomenon, commonly known as
"bunching," occurs under a graduated rate system because the in-
cremental increases in value presumably would have been taxed at
rates lower on average than the total amount taxed upon
realization. 9
A final economic consideration concerns the concept of where-
withal to pay The contention is simple: because capital gains are
uncertain and irregular, they should not represent taxpaying ca-
93. The effect of inflation is an ancreasingly important factor in our tax system. For exam-
ple, the advent of tax rate, standard deduction, and personal exemption indexation based on
changes in the Consumer Price Index represented a major equitable change in the tax law,
primarily during inflationary periods. See I.R.C. §§ 1(f), 63(c), 151(d) (1988).
Considering the disparity between low-income and high-income individuals, specifically
indexing capital gains and losses is necessary for fairness because the poor suffer signifi-
cantly larger capital asset changes attributable to inflation than do the wealthy. DAVIES,
supra note 78, at 99-100 (citing a study by the National Bureau of Economic Research); see
supra note 80 (citing capital asset incomes at various levels of wealth).
94. DAVIES, supra note 78, at 92, 95; SELTZER, supra note 26, at 51-52.
95. DUE & FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 24, at 262; SELTZER, supra note 26, at 51-52.
96. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 52. Given that the tax rates are now indexed, see supra
note 93, this adjustment may not be adequate because unlike ordinary income, the essence
of capital gains and losses is the change in price of the particular asset. DAVIES, supra note
78, at 95.
Although accounting for inflation and deflation related to capital assets may seem admin-
istratively difficult, the necessary information--dates of acquisition and disposition and in-
flation factors such as the Consumer Price Index published by the Department of La-
bor-appears readily available, and implementation as part of an overall revision of capital
transaction taxation could not result in more problems than those currently existing.
97. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 10.
98. DAVIES, supra note 78, at 94; SELTZER, supra note 26, at 10.
99. DAVIES, supra note 78, at 94.
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pacity equal to that of ordinary income, which is of a recurring,
dependable nature.100
Basic Market Operations
Ordinary profits may be described as coming from everyday bus-
iness. The manufacturer earns these profits by conversion of raw
materials or semifinished goods into other semifinished goods or
finished goods. 10' The wholesaler's business is the redistribution of
goods to facilitate the market process; this function may include
breaking up quantities into parcels that are more easily distrib-
uted, providing logistic redistribution, or simply holding goods un-
til the market can accept them. 02 The retailer produces ordinary
income by providing point-of-sale to the ultimate consumer in
forms and with commensurate services that the consumer may
demand. 03
Alternatively, capital gains and losses typically result not from
business profits but from price level changes within a given market
applicable to capital assets. 04 Capital assets generally are income-
producing assets-investment vehicles in any form'05 and, in
broader language, personal and nonbusiness property at the con-
sumer level. 10 6
Obviously, then, use or purpose largely influences or controls the
definition of the capital asset. As a simplistic illustration, compare
the red Ferrari that you thought you could purchase after law
school, which sits on the dealer's lot, to the car you owned'in law
school, which you continued to keep because of student loans and
other real-world expenses. The former is not a capital asset; it is
the essence of the dealer's business and its sale represents the ex-
pected profit of the business. The latter, however, is a capital asset;
100. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 10.
101. Id. at 3. In the case of an individual, wages from employment are considered "busi-
ness" profits. Id. at 4-5.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 3-4.
105. The most common are stocks, bonds, realty, and interests in partnerships, contracts,
and leases. Id. at 4.
106. Id.
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it is held for personal use, not for resale,"' so when it is sold, the
gain or loss will be capital.108
Legal Distinctions
This simplistic illustration, of course, does not permeate all
transactions. In fact, the extent of its application is relatively lim-
ited for either economic or legal analysis.'10 The nature of profits
and losses is often mixed or clouded.10 Moreover, the legal divid-
ing line often deviates from the general understanding. For in-
stance, the holding period"' of the asset may determine whether
any preference will apply to a capital transaction. 112 Satisfying a
one-year holding period requirement, for example, qualifies the
gain or loss for preferential long-term treatment; gain or loss on an
asset held for a shorter period would receive ordinary short-term
treatment."13 The cutoff between the occasional investor and one
107. Notably, if it were held for resale as an antique or vintage car, it still would be a
capital asset as an "investment auto." Unlike in the case of the personal-use auto, the loss
on the sale of an investment auto, if any, would be recognizable for tax purposes. See infra
notes 108, 166 and accompanying text.
108. Unfortunately, the loss, in contrast to the gain, is not recognized for tax purposes
because of its personal nature. See I.R.C. § 165 (1988).
109. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 4-5.
110. Id. at 67. The mixture in character of many types of income stems from the unfore-
seeability of all capital value changes. Id. For instance, an investor may anticipate a rise in a
particular stock and actually go so far as to count on this eventual income. Based on expec-
tations, if the risk-taking results in a favorable outcome, the income derived will have ele-
ments of ordinary income associated with it, in this case wages. Expectations of changes in
the capital asset's value must be contrasted with expectations of income the asset will
produce.
111. "Holding period" simply means the amount of time elapsed during which the tax-
payer held a particular property. I.R.C. § 1223(1). In cases involving a carryover basis, such
as gift transfers, the holding period of the transferor "tacks on" to the holding period of the
transferee. Id. § 1223(2); see id. § 1015. Inherited property, which generally gets a "step up"
in basis, is deemed to be held by the recipient for more than six months. Id. §§ 1014,
1223(11).
112. Id. §§ 1(j), 1222. Preferential treatment can arise notwithstanding the holding period
requirement. See id. § 1231(a)(3)(A) (providing that gain on property used in a trade or
business qualifies as "section 1231 gain" and thus may receive preferential treatment under
§§ 1231(a)(I), 1222, and 10)).
113. Id. § 1222. This dividing line has varied among 24, 18, 12, and 6 months in the
history of U.S. tax law. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 5. In other countries, the holding period
is sometimes many years; for example, to receive capital asset treatment in Sweden, real
property formerly must have been held 10 years and all other property five years. Id.
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engaged in buying and selling to the point of engaging in a busi-
ness also can become blurred.1
14
Many other statutory provisions and judicial assertions may
come into play to dim any bright lines demarcating the capital as-
set definition. Section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code, the so-
called "best of both worlds" provision," 5 treats gains in excess of
losses from dispositions of property used in a trade or business as
long-term capital gain but treats the excess of losses over gains in-
volving the same property as ordinary loss.116 Two other Internal
114. The question is when do capital gains become ordinary income? The significance,
purpose, nature, frequency, and regularity of a transaction are major indicia of where one
might fall on the continuum. See, e.g., Higgins .v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941)
(holding that an investor for one's own account is not engaged in a trade or business); Reese
v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 226, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that a single venture
without expectation of continuation in the field is not ordinarily a business); International
Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 157, 160-61 (1st Cir.) (holding that although a
taxpayer typically leased machines, had no sales support, and had tried to dissuade a cus-
tomer from making a purchase, he held the machine primarily for sale in the course of
business), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974).
In the case of securities, generally the typical investor will hold capital assets because his
sales are not usually to customers; however, dealers who do sell to customers typically hold
inventory (noncapital assets) unless they hold a security for private investment. See, e.g.,
Carl Marks & Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1196, 1200 (1949) (holding that certain securi-
ties held by a dealer were nonetheless capital assets). But cf. Frank v. Commissioner, 321
F.2d 143, 148-51 (8th Cir. 1963) (ruling that certain securities, despite significant private
investments, were held as by a dealer).
Considerations such as these apply to real estate transactions as well, except that tax-
payer subdivision and/or improvement also operates as a deciding factor. See, e.g., Hansche
v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 429, 434-35 (7th Cir. 1972) (finding ordinary income when the
gain resulted from substantial subdivision and development by taxpayers).
115. See, e.g., Paramont Land Co. v. United States, 556 F Supp. 815, 817 (W.D. Va.
1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1984).
116. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(2). However, § 1245 and § 1250 can easily diminish the impact of
§ 1231. Section 1245 provides generally that gains from the disposition of personalty used in
a trade or business shall be treated as ordinary, notwithstanding § 1231, to the extent of
previous depreciation cost recovery. Id. § 1245. Section 1250 provides that gains from the
disposition of realty used in a trade or business shall be treated as ordinary, notwithstand-
ing § 1231, to the extent of previous accelerated cost recovery in excess of what depreciation
deduction would have applied under a straight line method. Id. § 1250.
Section 1231, though, has its own recapture provision that operates below the overriding
control of § 1245 and § 1250. Section 1231(c) requires that § 1231 gain, otherwise eligible for
capital gain treatment under the section, be treated as ordinary to the extent of the five
immediately preceding years' § 1231 losses not already recaptured under § 1231(c). Id. §
1231(c). The losses are considered recaptured in chronological order (on a first-in-first-out
basis). See H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1034 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 494.
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Revenue Code provisions, sections 1234 and 1234A, specify that
the nature of the gain or loss related to certain options to buy
property is to be determined by looking to the character of the
property underlying the option if in the "hands of the taxpayer." 117
Some of the noteworthy judicial glosses placed on the capital as-
set definition relate to the meaning of "property" contained in the
statutory definition, the "substitute" theory, and the evolution of
the Corn Products doctrine."' The courts' revelations regarding
the scope of the term "property" in section 1221 alone have cre-
ated a quagmire in the definition of the capital asset. The Supreme
Court, for instance, has held that property compensable under the
Takings Clause" 9 is not necessarily property under section 1221.120
Another salient issue in this area is whether any property rights
even exist to receive capital gains treatment. A leading Second Cir-
cuit opinion determined that payment to the taxpayer for certain
privacy rights-name, image, reputation-was ordinary income in-
stead of capital gain because local law did not recognize these
rights under the particular facts.' 2 '
The "substitution" .theory concerns the characterization of a
payment received in disposition of a right to receive future ordi-
nary income. A typical case is Hort v. Commissioner,122 which in-
volved a financially strained tenant who made a lump-sum pay-
ment in satisfaction of and release from a long-term lease. 23 The
Court held simply that the payment was in substitution of future
117. I.R.C. §§ 1234, 1234A.
118. See tnfra notes 180-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Corn Products
doctrine.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.").
120. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Co., 364 U.S. 130 (1960). The Court stated that it
would construe the definition of capital asset narrowly
to afford capital-gains treatment only in situations typically involving the reali-
zation of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time.
[R]espondent's right to use its facilities was held to be a valuable property
right compensable under the Fifth Amendment. However, that right was
simply an incident of the underlying physical property
Id. at 134-36.
121. Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706, 707, 711 (2d Cir.) (involving payment to Glenn
Miller's widow for her "property rights" in her deceased husband's name, image, and like-
ness), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962).
122. 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
123. Id. at 28-29.
904 [Vol. 34:885
CAPITAL ASSET DEFINITION
rentals, which are ordinary income, and therefore should likewise
be characterized as ordinary 124 However, if Hort had sold the en-
tire building including the remaining lease term, the entire trans-
action would have received capital gain treatment even though
some of the payment received presumably would have been attrib-
utable to the lease.125
Impact of Capital Gains Taxatin
One of the basic tenets of taxation is that differing resource allo-
cations and institutional frameworks will result from differing ap-
proaches to taxation. 2 ' Varying tax formulas for capital gains and
losses are no exception. The tax structure can effect changes in the
allocation of labor, capital, and product markets. 127 Primary public
policy considerations when dealing with capital gains are economic
growth, efficient resource utilization, and economic stabilization at
full employment.128
The taxation of capital gains impacts economic growth by way of
its effect on real investment-both the demand for and supply of
financial securities. 12 From the demand side of the equation, the
desire for capital assets is directly proportionate to the preferential
treatment applied to these assets. 130 More simply, capital assets ac-
corded a greater tax preference will see a higher real rate of return
and thus a greater demand. The extent to which this chain of
124. Id. at 32.
125. This situation is analogous to that in McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947), which involved a life-income beneficiary's
transfer of her entire interest to the remainderman. The court distinguished between the
"anticipation of income payments over a reasonably short period of time and an out-and-out
transfer of a substantial and durable property interest, such as a life estate." Id. at 237.
Compare this treatment to the sale of an entire concern that is required to be "broken
up" into its component assets for characterization of gain and loss. See, e.g., Williams v.
McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945) (requiring separate application of the capital
asset definition to each asset of a sole proprietorship upon sale, denying treatment as one
giant "capital asset").
126. For a succinct summary of the economic effects, see George F Break, The Percep-
tion of Power: The Capital Gains Story, 52 TAX NOTES 229, 229 (1991); MARTIN DAVID,
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 2 (1968).
127. DAVID, supra note 126, at 2.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 3; DUE & FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 24, at 263.
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events affects the economy depends on whether the additional cap-
ital created enters a capital market in need of more supply 131
Concerning the supply side, many consequences are possible.
Generally, the increased return to the investor from capital gains
will allow corporations to lower the dividends they pay and
thereby increase internal earnings available. 3 2 This increase in re-
tained earnings will reduce the need for capital raised through is-
suing additional stock. 3 ' Depending on the balance between up-
ward effects of increased retained earnings and the downward
effects of a lower dividend payout,"'3 corporate stock prices too
would be adjusted by the market. Of course, stock prices will move
according to the new equilibrium established by these supply and
demand effects as well.13 5
The economic effect of capital asset taxation on the efficient al-
location of resources is also important. The increased attractive-
ness of investments that receive preferences skews the comparative
yields away from alternative investments.' 36 The allocation of the
131. DAVID, supra note 126, at 3. Increased capital presumably would result because sav-
ings would rise in two related ways. First, the advantage of saving would be greater, and
second, the resulting increased return (or "income") ultimately would be partly disposed of
and partly saved. DAVIES, supra note 78, at 109-10. The attractiveness of aggrandizement of
saving occurs because higher returns will influence one's decision where to place discretion-
ary funds. Assuming the appeal of increased returns does increase rates of saving, the re-
turns flowing from larger aggregate investments create additional discretionary funds that
may again enter the cycle. See id. at 109-11. The economist's terms for measuring the mar-
ginal changes in disposable income that one chooses to spend and that one chooses to save
are the "marginal propensity to consume" and the "marginal propensity to save." See id. at
110.
132. DAVID, supra note 126, at 3; DAVIES, supra note 78, at 110. This situation would
function less effectively in periods of rising or high inflation. Id. at 110. Several generaliza-
tions regarding times of elevated inflation account for this fact: these periods are poor times
to retain cash, good times to be a debtor, and perhaps good times to purchase assets such as
plant and equipment.
133. DAVID, supra note 126, at 3. The need for borrowing presumably would fall also. Id.
Because of the new level of capital available through savings and the reduced corporate
need for borrowing, a drop in interest rates would likely occur. Id.
134. On balance, a rising capital gain that is preferentially treated, offset with equally
falling dividends taxed at ordinary rates, will produce rising stock prices, all other things
being equal. See DAVIES, supra note 78, at 107 (attributing the expected stock price in-
creases in such situations to improved after-tax rates of return).
135. Whether the new equilibrium is an improvement in the level of real investment will
depend greatly on the transaction costs associated with fewer equity issuances and a less
fluid market source of funds. DAVID, supra note 126, at 3.
136. Id. at 4; DUE & FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 24, at 263.
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investment dollar (risk capital) very well may shift away from
more optimal uses for the capital as a result of the preference.
1 3 7
WHERE WE HAVE BEEN: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Internal Revenue Laws
The Evolution
During the period from 1913 to 1921, the tax laws made no dis-
tinction between capital assets and other kinds of property ' 38 All
gains from the sales of property were taxable in full as ordinary
income, whereas losses were deductible only if the taxpayer used
the property in a trade or business. 139 Congress, however, relaxed
this loss rule somewhat in 1916 to provide that losses from prop-
erty sales would be deductible if related to a transaction entered
into for profit.140
The Revenue Act of 19211'1 contained the first specified capital
asset definition'42 and also provided for the application of special
137. DAVID, supra note 126, at 4. Considering the tax preference on capital asset apprecia-
tion and the effect of reducing corporate dividends, the more venture-oriented enterprises
will attract capital. Stable companies, however, which are typically large manufacturing con-
cerns with more constant stock prices and higher dividend payouts, may suffer. See supra
notes 126-35 and accompanying text.
Conversely, the increased risk-taking may prove to be beneficial. Because the corporate
form will be encouraged and capital gains may be realized at a pace rivaling ordinary in-
come, start-up businesses will increase. DuE & FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 24, at 263. But see
I.R.C. § 341 (1988) (discouraging and limiting the use of "collapsible corporations" to trans-
form ordinary income into capital gain by purposeful liquidation).
138. The essence of the income definition in the Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.B, 38
Stat. 114, 166, was maintained until 1921; net income during this interim was defined as
including gains, profits, and income derived from sales and dealings in real and personal
property and, generally, gains, profits, and income from any source.
139. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 20.
140. Id.
141. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
142. According to the definition, property held more than two years generally attained
capital asset status; inventory and personal-use property were not capital assets. Id. §
206(a)(6), 42 Stat. at 233. Recognition of the lock-in effect was at least part of the reason for
this first distinction between capital and ordinary assets. See supra notes 67-84 and accom-
panying text. The House Ways and Means Committee stated that sales of capital assets
were being inhibited because "gains and profits earned over a series of years are under the
present law taxed as a lump sum in the year in which the profit is realized." H.R. REP.
No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921).
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treatment to capital gains recognized by individuals. 14 3 Such spe-
cial treatment did not yet apply to corporations; corporate capital
gains continued to receive ordinary income treatment until 1942.14
This "original" statutory definition was that property acquired
and held by a taxpayer-either for profit or investment-for more
than two years was a capital asset.145  This definition was unaf-
fected by whether the taxpayer used assets in trade or business,
but it did exclude personal-use assets and stock-in-trade or other
inventoried property 146
In 1924, Congress modified the 1921 Act's definition.147 By elimi-
nating the requirement of profit or investment and the exclusion of
personal property, individuals were able to benefit from the prefer-
ential rates on sales of homes and other property not acquired for
profit.148 This alteration applied until the Revenue Act of 1934,149
which further constrained the definitional exclusions. 150
143. SEIDMAN, supra note 65, at 810-13. Section 206(b) of the Act provided that the tax-
payer could elect a separate capital gains rate of 12.5% to apply only to capital gains. Ch.
136, § 206(b), 42 Stat. at 233. If the taxpayer's effective rate on all income was below 12.5%,
no benefit arose from this provision. SEIDMAN, supra note 65, at 813.
144. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 20-21.
145. SEIDMAN, supra note 65, at 811. The two-year holding period requirement was pro-
posed by Senators Walsh and McCumber because the Senate Finance Committee had pro-
posed a capital gains preference to the effect that only 40% of such gains would be taxable.
Id. at 812-13. The Senators perceived an unfairness in taxing current wages in full while
taxing only 40% of a sudden capital gain windfall. Id. The lawmakers changed the capital
gains tax preference from the proposed reduction in the percentage of gain taxed to a lower
rate applied to the full amount of capital gains; however, they retained the holding period
requirement because the change did not eliminate the element of unfairness. Id.
146. Id. at 811. Senator Lenroot proposed an additional exclusion for corporate stock be-
cause he believed that stock dividends would become preferred to cash dividends in light of
the capital gains tax preference; the Conference Committee, however, deleted the addition.
Id.
147. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 208(a)(8), 43 Stat. 253, 263.
148. The attempt by the House to exclude stock dividends from capital assets was re-
jected because "[t]here is no logical reason why such stock does not constitute a capital
asset, as well as other stock." SEIDMAN, supra note 65, at 717 (quoting S. REP. No. 398, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1924)). The attempt at exclusion was apparently related to the Supreme
Court's decision that stock dividends did not constitute income. See supra notes 65-66.
149. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680.
150. The only significant provision created in the interim was contained in the Act of
1926, ch. 27, § 208(a)(8), 44 Stat. 9, 19-20, which contained a tacking provision for taxpayers
receiving property with a transferred basis. In the provision's current form, "tacking" refers
to a continuation in holding period, usually from transferor to transferee. I.RPC. § 1223
(1988).
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Congress' broadening of the definition of capital assets by nar-
rowing the exclusions from capital assets in 1934 was motivated by
a desire to prevent ordinary loss deductions previously taken by
professional traders in stocks and commodities.151 To effect the
change, Congress replaced the exclusion of "property held by the
taxpayer primarily for sale in the course of his trade or business"
with an exclusion of "property held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his business."' 52 Fur-
ther, the legislature removed the exclusion of assets held by the
taxpayer for less than two years.'
The Revenue Act of 1934 also placed limitations on the deduct-
ibility of capital losses. Before 1934, any losses on the sale of busi-
ness equipment or buildings could be deducted fully against cor-
porate income.15  Congress limited these losses on depreciable
property to capital gains plus $2,000, prompting an outcry of un-
fairness. 55 Taxpayers who chose to deduct limited amounts of de-
preciation during their use of the property would be penalized
upon selling it. 15 6 Congress responded in the Revenue Act of
1938157 by excluding depreciable property used in a trade or busi-
ness from capital asset status. 15 Consequently, both corporate and
individual taxpayers were permitted to deduct fully losses arising
from the sale of depreciable business property 15 The provisions
151. H.R. REP. No. 1385, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1934).
152. SEIDMAN, supra note 65, at 364.
153. See id.
154. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 21-22.
155. SEIDMAN, supra note 65, at 365; SELTZER, supra note 26, at 21-22.
156. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 21. Under these limitations, property depreciated in a
conservative manner had a higher basis upon sale than property depreciated in an aggres-
sive manner. A sale of the former, therefore, would more likely result in nondeductible
losses than a sale of the latter. Alternatively, the taxpayer.could have held the property
instead of selling it and continued to take depreciation deductions until the basis reached
zero.
157. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447.
158. Id. § 117(a)(1), 52 Stat. at 500.
159. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 22. This change allowed full deduction of losses from the
sale of under-depreciated assets instead of limiting the deduction to capital gains plus a
nominal additional amount. See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 34 (1938). The
House Ways and Means Committee Report stated:
This important change [recognizes] that gains or losses realized upon the
sale, exchange, or other disposition of such property are business gains or
losses and, as such, directly affect the volume of the business profits which
1993]
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affecting depreciable property, of course, still did not apply to in-
ventories. 60 Additionally, to qualify as depreciable business prop-
erty, the property must have been in such use at the time of dispo-
sition.'' The use, however, did not have to be active. If the
property was being held in reserve for business use, its idleness was
not detrimental, but if its intended use had changed, the property
would not be excluded from capital asset status.1 62
Current Definition and Treatment16 3
The statutory definition of the capital asset has changed very
little since 1938, except for the addition of some very narrow ex-
should be subjected to tax in the years in which such transactions occur.
[The change] is limited to property used by the taxpayer in his trade or busi-
ness at the time of the sale or exchange, of a character which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation It therefore has no application to gains or
losses allocable to the land
Id., see SEIDMAN, supra note 65, at 65-66.
However, land was often difficult to separate from its attachments in calculating gains
and losses, and World War II caused a huge turnover of realty. SELTZER, supra note 26, at
22-23. To insure that all losses would be fairly deducted, Congress responded with the Reve-
nue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 151, 56 Stat. 798, 846, which provided that no depreciable or real
property used in a trade or business was a capital asset. Nevertheless, the statute applied
capital gains treatment to the same property sold at a gain if the property had been held at
least six months. Id., see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
160. SELTZER, supra note 26, at 23.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 24. At the time, "trade or business" had not yet been defined by statute or by
Bureau of Internal Revenue regulation. Id. In Schwinn v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1304
(1928), the Board of Tax Appeals stated that "trade or business refer[red] to a regular
occupation or calling of the taxpayer, for the purpose of livelihood or profit." Id. at 1308.
163. At the time of this Note's publication, President Clinton has proposed numerous
changes in the tax law as part of his economic program. Provisions affecting capital gains
taxation involve a widened tax rate differential and a targeted capital gains tax preference.
For individual taxpayers, Clinton advocates a new top marginal income tax rate of 36%
coupled with a 10% "surtax" on certain wealthy taxpayers. Draft Explanation of Clinton
Tax Proposals Available, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, Taxana
Library, TNT File (93 TNT 43-1) (authored by the U.S. Treasury Department) [hereinafter
Clinton Tax Proposals]. Neither rate increase applies to the taxation of capital gains, which
would remain subject to the current maximum rate of 28%. See infra note 169. Thus, the
structural capital gains rate preference under Clinton's proposal would reach a maximum of
11.6% [(36% x 110%) - 28%] as compared to the current 3% (31% - 28%).
In the case of the proposed targeted capital gains exclusion, Clinton's plan would benefit
all taxpayer investors except subchapter C corporations. Under this change, investors hold-
ing "qualified small business stock" would be allowed to exclude 50% of the gains realized
on disposition of the stock if they have held the stock at least five years prior to disposition.
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ceptions.6 4 Located at section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code,
they state:
[T]he term "capital asset" means property held by the taxpayer
(whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does
not include-
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or inventory of the tax-
payer , or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of business;
Clinton Tax Proposals, supra. Also, several definitional limitations are relevant to the ap-
plication of the proposal. To qualify as "qualified small business stock" 1) the investor
would have to acquire the stock after December 31, 1992; 2) the stock would have to be
"original issue" stock; 3) the issuing business must be a subehapter C corporation with less
than $25 million of aggregate capitalization from January 1, 1993 through the date the tax-
payer acquires the stock; and 4) the issuing corporation must use substantially all of its
assets in the active conduct of a trade or business during the investor's holding period. Id.
Lastly, certain business activities-services, banking, leasing, real estate, farming, mineral
extraction, and hospitality-specifically would be excluded from qualification. Id.
Two further limitations applicable to the targeted capital gains exclusion would prevent
unlimited gains from escaping taxation. First, the amount of gain excluded could not exceed
the greater of 10 times the taxpayer's basis in the stock or $1 million; this limit would be
applied separately to each qualified small business investment. Id. Second, one half of any
exclusion claimed would be treated as a tax preference item by individual taxpayers under
the alternative minimum tax system. Id., see I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (1988).
Concerning corporate taxpayers, whether Clinton's plan as currently formulated involves
any capital gains taxation preferences is unclear. Although his plan includes an increase in
the corporate top marginal tax rate from 34% to 36%, preliminary information on Clinton's
proposals makes no mention of whether the legislation will tamper with the currently "non-
beneficial" corporate capital gains rate ceiling of 34%, which is located at I.R.C. § 1201. See
Clinton Tax Proposals, supra; infra note 171 and accompanying text. If § 1201 is left intact,
a nominal rate preference of 2% (36% - 34%) would benefit those corporations whose in-
come level invokes the top marginal tax rates and who have capital gains income. If, how-
ever, Clinton's exclusion of subchapter C corporations from the benefit of the targeted capi-
tal gains proposal mentioned above is an indication that he intends not to provide any
benefit to corporations in the area of capital gains, corporations may ultimately be subject
to a top marginal tax rate of 36% on all income. Of course, Clinton's entire economic plan
has yet to experience the mutilation of the legislative process. Already, Senator Bumpers
from Clinton's home state of Arkansas has proposed that a targeted capital gains preference,
similar to the exclusion discussed above, apply to both individual and corporate taxpayers.
Bumpers Bill Would Cut Capital Gains Rate, TAx NoTEs TODAY, Feb. 26, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File (93 TNT 46-79) (discussing S. 368, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (introduced by Sen. Dale Bumpers, D-Ark)).
164. The copyright exclusion, trade receivables exclusion, and letters exclusion were
added by the Acts of 1950, 1954, and 1969, respectively. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994,
§ 210(a), 64 Stat. 906, 933; Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 1221(4), 68A Stat. 321,
322; Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 514, 83 Stat. 487, 643.
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(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character
which is subject to the allowance for depreciation , or real
property used in his trade or business;
(3) [certain copyrights, compositions, or similar creations held
by the creator]
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary
course of trade or business
(5) [certain government publications]."6 5
In addition to being classified as a capital asset, the asset must
be sold or exchanged to qualify for capital gain treatment.16
Whether an event qualifies as a sale or exchange is not always
straightforward. For example, both the abandonment of an asset 167
and the cancellation of a contract right'68 have failed to qualify as
a sale or exchange.
Once the definitional and sale/exchange prerequisites have been
met, the taxpayer typically receives the tax benefit. Currently, in
the case of individual taxpayers, a nominal capital gains tax rate
preference is applicable, 6 " but the deductibility of capital losses is
limited to capital gains plus $3,000.170 For corporations, no tax rate
165. I.R.C. § 1221.
166. Id. § 1222. Note, however, that the gain or loss "from the sale or other disposition of
property" is recognized unless otherwise disallowed or denied. Id. § 1001(a), (c) (emphasis
added).
167. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 57-503, 1957-2 C.B. 139. A sale or exchange does occur, however,
if cancellation or diminution in indebtedness is present. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Commissioner,
77 T.C. 113 (1981) (involving the abandonment of a partnership interest); Freeland v. Com-
missioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980) (involving the abandonment of an encumbered property
interest).
168. See, e.g., Hoover Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 206 (1979), nonacq., 1980-2 C.B. 2.
169. The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11101(a), (c), 104
Stat. 1388-400, 1388-403 to -405 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1(h) (1992)), reinstituted
the tax rate preference removed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 101,
302, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096, 2218 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1 (1988)). Section 1(h) now
provides a maximum 28% tax rate for capital gains, whereas ordinary income is taxed at a
maximum rate of 31%. I.R.C. § 1(a)-(e), (h) (1992).
170. I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1988). Before reaching the deductibility limitations of capital losses,
both gains and losses are subject to a netting process. Id. § 1222. First, short-term gains and
losses are netted separately from long-term gains and losses. Id., see supra notes 111-13 and
accompanying text (describing short-term and long-term holding periods). Only losses that
are deductible for tax purposes-those "taken into account in computing taxable in-
come"-are considered in the netting process; for individuals, these losses are generally only
business, investment, and casualty losses. I.R.C. § 1222. The net "shorts" are then combined
with the net "longs." Id. Both net long-term gains in excess of net short-term losses and the
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preference is currently in effect 171 and deductible capital losses are
limited to capital gains.172
The Legislatwe Purpose
The statutory exclusions in the capital asset definition allude to
an intent to restrict capital asset treatment to those transactions
realizing gain or loss that do not indicate recurrent and normally
expected returns from wealth (capital), management and entrepre-
neurship, or plain labor in the context of a business enterprise.1 3
The examples of such expected returns are explicit in the stat-
ute-inventories, depreciable and other realty used in the business,
whole of net long-term gains in the absence of net short-term losses generally will receive
capital gains treatment. Id. §§ 1(j), 1222. If net short-term gains exceed net long-term losses,
or if net short-term gains exist along with net long-term gains, the excess of net short-term
gain in the former case and the whole of the net short-term gain in the latter case are simply
treated as ordinary income. See id.
In the case of either net short-term or long-term capital losses exceeding or equaling net
short-term or long-term capital gains, the losses offset the gains dollar-for-dollar; addition-
ally, any remaining losses offset up to $3,000 of an individual taxpayer's ordinary income.
Id. § 1211(b). Remaining capital losses are carried forward indefinitely for future use in the
case of individuals. Id. § 1212(b). The character of the loss carryover, short term or long
term, extends into the future, but a statutory twist applies to determine the carryover char-
acter when the loss consists of both long-term and short-term loss. Id. By creating artificial
short-term gain in the year in which the carryover arises, the provision effectively consumes
net short-term loss first during the offset of up to $3,000 of ordinary income. See id.
§ 1212(b)(2). The result is always the lowest amount of short-term loss carryover possible.
This method reduces the future short-term loss available to offset short-term gain. Short-
term gain surviving the § 1222 netting process otherwise would receive ordinary-income
treatment. The taxpayer would prefer the opposite approach, which would increase the
chances for creating net long-term gains that receive all available preferential treatment.
171. Corporate taxpayers still are not afforded any capital gains concessions. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 removed the prior flat 28% rate preference applicable to corporations.
§ 311, 100 Stat. at 2219. The present corporate maximum tax rate of 34% under § 11 of the
Internal Revenue Code also applies to capital gains; as part of the 1986 Act, however, Con-
gress included a 34% rate ceiling on capital gains in anticipation of future corporate rate
increases applicable to ordinary income. Id., I.R.C. §§ 11, 1201; see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841,
99th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-106 to -107 (1986). Of course, should corporate rates increase, the
resultant benefit of § 1201 can easily disappear with additional legislation.
172. The netting process described supra note 170 also applies to corporations, except no
provisions such as § 1212(b)(2) apply because corporations are not allowed to deduct any
capital losses in excess of capital gains. Regarding corporate capital losses not used in a
taxable year, a carryback period of three years is required; any unused losses are then car-
ried forward for up to five years. I.R.C. § 1212(a). Also, the character of all corporate capital
loss carrybacks and carryforwards is deemed to be short term. Id.
173. DAVID, supra note 126, at 21-22.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
and receivables. 174 Unfortunately, neither the format of the defi-
nition, nor additional revenue statutes, nor inconsistent judicial
opinions has made this simplistic intent effective. 175
Economic parallels help to describe several purposes that justify
special treatment of capital assets. Preferences for capital transac-
tions may-
(1) secur[e] more equitable tax treatment for investment gains
which have accrued over long periods of time and which would
be assessed in a single year under progressive income tax rates;
(2) reduc[e] the inequitable taxation of increments to capital
that arise from illusory revaluations, such as inflation; and (3)
minimiz[e] interference with the operation of assets markets,
which, in many cases, are characterized by a limited number of
buyers and sellers. 176
Additionally, reducing the progressive tax effects on capital trans-
actions is warranted to mitigate applying the usual tax treatment
to unusual situations. Total income realized from an asset transac-
tion may have accrued over many years and may represent a sut
generts occasion to the investor, or an ultimate or attendant trans-
action may bear an intimate relation to another transaction that
would be or is eligible for capital asset treatment.177 Regarding this
latter circumstance, the reverse relation should also be true. That
is, a transaction sufficiently related to a noncapital asset transac-
tion should not merit capital asset treatment.'7 8
174. I.R.C. § 1221.
175. See supra notes 19-22, 109-25 and accompanying text (discussing statutory construc-
tions and judicial glosses applicable to the capital asset definition).
176. DAVID, supra note 126, at 37; see supra notes 85-137 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the economic foundation of the capital asset).
177. DAVID, supra note 126, at 37-38; cf. infra notes 180-263 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing courts' determinations of legislative purpose).
178. But see Azar Nut Co. v. Commissioner, 931 F.2d 314 (1991) (coming to an opposite
conclusion); infra notes 212-38 and accompanying text.
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Doctrinal Cases1 79
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner8 0 involved a grain
product manufacturer who purchased corn futures contracts1 81 to
ensure an adequate supply of raw corn. 8 2 Having incurred a gain
of $680,587 and a loss of $109,969 on the contracts during tax years
1940 and 1942, respectively, the taxpayer sought a ruling that the
futures contracts were capital assets. 13 Finding the transactions
vitally important to maintaining a source of supply, the Supreme
Court disagreed with the contention that the assets were "prop-
erty" distinct from the manufacturing business.1
8 4
Upon deciding that the futures contracts did not fall into a spe-
cific statutory exception, the Court stated that the definition of
capital assets "must not be so broadly applied as to defeat rather
then [sic] further the purpose of Congress.' 1 85 In the Court's opin-
ion, "Congress intended that profits and losses arising from the
everyday operation of a business be considered as ordinary income
or loss rather than capital gain or loss."' s The Court reasoned fur-
ther that to effect congressional purpose regarding such an excep-
179. For an in-depth development of earlier capital gains cases, see Kornhauser, supra
note 23 (focusing on historical dialogue).
180. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
181. A commodity futures contract obligates the seller of the contract to deliver the com-
modity to the buyer on the indicated date at the indicated price; the price of the contract is
determined by reference to the current commodity price and the perception of likely in-
creases or decreases in price. DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS L. HAZEN, SECURITIEs REGULATION
273 (4th ed. 1991).
182. Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 48.
183. Id. at 49.
184. Id. at 50.
185. Id. at 51-52. This was not the first time that an understood congressional intent and
purpose was used to carve out special treatment for capital assets. A Supreme Court inter-
pretation of the Act of 1924, which reflected the original capital asset treatment provisions
of the Act of 1921 without change, held that an oil and gas royalty system passing actual
title to the lessee resulted in ordinary income even though no specific capital asset exception
of this kind was in place. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932). The Court stated that
the special capital gains enactment was "to relieve the taxpayer from excessive tax
burdens on gains resulting from a conversion of capital investments, and to remove the
deterrent effect of those burdens." Id. To allow capital treatment in this case "would have
tended to defeat rather than further the purpose of the Act." Id. at 106-08.
186. Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 52. The Court further stated that the statute "was in-
tended 'to relieve the taxpayer from excessive tax burdens on gains resulting from a
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tion to "normal tax requirements, the definition of a capital
asset must be narrowly applied and its exclusions interpreted
broadly ",187 The Court also remarked that it would create a loop-
hole if it held that the sale of a futures contract was a capital
transaction while actual delivery under the contract was not.188
This latter reasoning is in the vein of the substitution ap-
proach, 189 in the sense that the court examines the underlying
transaction, or in this case, the underlying purpose, in order to
characterize the asset. In terms of economic principles, the reason
for holding an asset is a fundamental indicator of its character. Al-
though surrounding facts and circumstances should not be ig-
nored,9 0 an asset's instant purpose in fact should be almost
determinative.
In Corn Products, the connection of the stock to the taxpayer's
main business was relatively clear and straightforward. The under-
lying purpose might have been a more determinative factor if Corn
Products had bought the stock as an investment also, or, still fur-
ther, if it actually had bought the stock with the sole intent of
speculation, notwithstanding any relation to its business.
Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner
In Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner,'91 a holding company
acquired bank stock for investment purposes but later acquired
additional stock, not to increase its investment, but to provide cap-
ital to the failing enterprise in an effort to maintain the value of
conversion of capital investments, and to remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on
such conversions.' " Id. (quoting Burnet, 287 U.S. at 106).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 54. Compare this reasoning to the lease cancellation scenario in Hort v. Com-
missioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text (discussing the substitution ap-
proach). In Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1988), the Court
was concerned with taxpayer influence over the transaction's character under a "substitu-
tion" approach coupled with intent. It pointed out that although allowing capital treatment
for a transaction of a truly ordinary nature would defeat the tax laws, to allow the taxpayer
to control character via assertion of motive would seem unchallengeable. Id.
190. For instance, someone asserting status as an investor in a plot of land should be
defeated by a past history of buying and selling numerous pieces of similar real estate. See
supra note 112.
191. 485 U.S. 212.
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the entire investment.192 Petitioner eventually sold the shares at a
loss of almost $10 million.193 The Tax Court determined that the
loss attributable to those shares purchased as an initial investment
was capital and that the loss attributable to the subsequent
purchase was ordinary 194 The court based its reasoning on a broad
reading of Corn Products creating a dichotomy between assets
"purchased with a substantial investment purpose" and those
"held for a business purpose."19
The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the Eighth Circuit's
determination that stock clearly fell within the general definition
of "capital asset" and was "outside the classes of property ex-
cluded from capital-asset status." '196 Arkansas Best agreed with the
Supreme Court's definitional assertions but contended that the
Court in Corn Products had "rejected a literal reading" of the defi-
nition in holding that "assets acquired and sold for ordinary busi-
ness purposes rather than for investment purposes should be given
ordinary-asset treatment."19 The Court acknowledged this inter-
pretation but stated that such a "broad reading finds no sup-
port"198 in the statute.
Turning to the statutory language, the Court discounted the use
of any "motive test" for determining the status of an asset because
the phrasing of section 1221, that capital assets include all prop-
erty " 'whether or not connected with [the taxpayer's] trade or
business' , makes irrelevant any consideration of the prop-
erty's connection with the taxpayer's business."19 9 The Court ex-
plained that the statute's enumeration of specific assets excluded
from the capital asset definition was meant as an exhaustive, not
illustrative, list. Thus, the Court was unwilling to "make[ ] sur-
plusage of these statutory exclusions"200 without congressional di-
rection.
192. Id. at 213-14.
193. Id. at 214.
194. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 640, 657 (1984), afl'd in part and
rev'd in part, 800 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
195. Id.
196. Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 223.
197. Id. at 216.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 217 (quoting I.R.C. § 1221 (1988)).
200. Id. at 218.
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In concluding that "motivation in purchasing an asset is irrele-
vant" 0' 1 to whether an asset is a capital asset and that the stock in
the instant case therefore retained its capital nature,2"2 the Court
again offered its interpretation of Corn Products.2 3 Because corn
futures can be viewed as surrogates for the actual raw material, the
Court held "that Corn Products is properly interpreted as involv-
ing an application of [the] inventory exception. '204 Concerning
the use of a "business connection" test, the Court stated,
"[A]lthough irrelevant to the initial determination whether an
item is a capital asset, [it] is relevant in determining the applica-
bility of certain of the statutory exceptions, including the inven-
tory exception. '20 5 The relation between the futures contracts and
the taxpayer's business in Corn Products was therefore important
in considering the inventory exception.206
Interestingly, the Court acknowledged that it was turning its
back on twenty-five years of a doctrine to which Congress had ac-
quiesced by its "inaction."20 7 The language it used in deflating the
Corn Products doctrine maintained a definite, strict interpretation
of the statute;20 in contrast to this view, the Supreme Court in
fact has used nonliteral interpretations of the Tax Code on numer-
ous occasions in an effort to effect Congress' purpose.20 9 This trend
201. Id. at 223.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 220-21.
204. Id. at 220.
205. Id. at 221.
206. Id.
207. Although congressional inaction is generally a poor measure of congressional
intent, we are given some pause by the fact that over 25 years have passed
since Corn Products without any sign of disfavor from Congress. We can-
not ignore the unambiguous language of § 1221, however, no matter how reti-
cent Congress has been. If a broad exclusion from capital-asset status is to be
created for assets acquired for business purposes, it must come from congres-
sional action, not silence.
Id. at 222 n.7 (citation omitted).
208. See td.
209. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) (concluding that
an educational entity meeting all statutory requirements of exempt status must also be
charitable in the common law sense to qualify as tax exempt); Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Com-
missioner, 460 U.S. 370, 399 (1983) (requiring income recognition under the tax benefit rule
notwithstanding an express statutory provision allowing nonrecognition); Helvering v. Mor-
gan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 (1934) ("[T]he true meaning of a single section of a statute
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of broad, "purpose" interpretations of the tax laws was even recog-
nized by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in a 1979 ruling.210
Ironically, the Court in Arkansas Best used its strict-interpreta-
tion-until-Congress-acts approach after Congress already had indi-
cated its acceptance of the Corn Products doctrine. Although they
did not convey the view in the form of statute, both Houses had
stated in congressional reports that under Corn Products, property
otherwise satisfying the literal language of section 1221 would not
be considered a capital asset if it was used "as an integral part of a
trade or business. 211
WHERE WE ARE GOING: NOWHERE
Azar Nut Co. v. Commissiner
Azar Nut Co. v. Commisswner2 2 involved a nut packaging and
marketing company in need of a high-level executive to replace re-
tiring owners.213 To attract a qualified person, Azar found that a
residence purchase agreement-a contract to purchase the execu-
tive's home in the event of termination-was a necessary part of
employment offers of this nature and level. 214 Azar released the ex-
ecutive after two years of employment and purchased his home in
accordance with the contract.1 5 Although Azar immediately listed
the house, almost two years passed before Azar sold the house at a
loss of $111,366.216 Azar had no capital gains during the tax year so
the loss, if characterized as capital, represented no tax benefit for
that year.21 The company argued that the house fell into section
however precise its language, cannot be ascertained if the mind be isolated from the
history of the income tax legislation of which it is an integral part.") (citation omitted).
210. Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382.
211. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 434 n.5 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 450 n.19 (1985). Additionally, Congress earlier declined an opportunity to adopt a
Treasury recommendation classifying securities as capital assets in all situations. STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 1ST SEss., DESCRIPTION OF TECH-
NICAL AND MINOR BILLS LISTED FOR A HEARING BY THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON
DECEMBER i0, at 56 (Comm. Print 1975).
212. 931 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1991).
213. Id. at 315.
214. Id. at 315-16.
215. Id. at 316.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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1221's second capital asset exception, which concerned property
used in the taxpayer's trade or business.21
The Fifth Circuit held that only a broad reading of "used in"
would encompass an asset purchased with a "business purpose," as
the term evolved under the Corn Products doctrine.1 In accor-
dance with the Supreme Court's narrow reading of Corn Products
in Arkansas Best, the court concluded that business purpose gen-
erally is irrelevant to whether an asset meets one of the capital
asset exceptions. 220 The court further noted that the words "used
in" required that property play a role in business operations to sat-
isfy the exception.221 Finally, in holding that Azar's loss was capi-
tal, the court distinguished an earlier case in which it held that the
sale of foreclosed homes by a building financier resulted in ordi-
nary loss.222 The court stated that the key to meeting the "used in"
exception was that the property represent an " 'essential ingredi-
ent of the business' "223 and be "used to protect the taxpayer's
capital."' 22' The court easily could have drawn a direct parallel to
this earlier ruling. Azar's hiring of the executive was contingent
upon its agreeing to purchase the house in the event of termina-
tion, hence an "essential ingredient." Azar's view thus considers
"essential" to mean "necessary" Second, although the house itself
was not "used to protect" its capital, Azar's hiring of a qualified
executive indeed was. Neither analogy is too attenuated; the court




220. Id. at 317.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 318 (quoting A.L. Carter Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 296, 297 (5th Cir.
1944)). The case Azar used in its argument, A.L. Carter, involved a taxpayer who supplied
building materials and financed home construction. A.L. Carter, 143 F.2d at 297. Forced to
foreclose on several hundred homes after the Depression, the taxpayer resold the houses at a
gain or loss computed by using the cost of the houses because the taxpayer had taken no
depreciation deductions. Id. The IRS's challenge related to this cost basis because deprecia-
tion is allowed on property "used in" a trade or business regardless of whether the taxpayer
takes it. Id. The court in A.L. Carter agreed with the IRS upon concluding that the manage-
ment and administration of foreclosed property was an essential part of financing. Id. at
297-98.
223. Azar Nut, 931 F.2d at 318 (quoting A.L. Carter, 143 F.2d at 297).
224. Id.
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As one commentator noted, "What is interesting about this case
is not the rather obvious result but the determination to ignore it
on the part of large employers, who consistently take the return
position that [such] losses are ordinary ",225 In fact, approxi-
mately one half of large employers employ sizeable staffs to exe-
cute the buying and selling of employees' houses while the other
half engage third-party relocation specialists; "whether the houses
are capital or ordinary assets can be worth several million dollars
annually "226
The IRS, meanwhile, continues to assert that the transactions
are capital. 27 Lobbyists for the large corporations, though, assert
that the real estate operations are ordinary because each employer
deals with "so many houses that it qualifie[s] as a dealer, making
the houses inventory, '228 or alternatively, because continual em-
ployee relocation is an obvious ordinary and necessary business in-
volvement so that losses on the houses are ordinary and necessary
business expenses of that involvement.229 The IRS's response effec-
tually rejected both of these arguments.230
225. Lee A. Sheppard, Losses on Sales of Employees' Houses After Azar Nut, 51 TAX
NOTES 1233, 1233-34 (1991).
226. Id. at 1234.
227. See Rev. Rul. 82-204, 1982-2 C.B. 192 (stating an employer's in-house program of
handling transferred employees' houses resulted in capital transactions because neither the
inventory nor the depreciable business property exception applied).
228. Sheppard, supra note 225, at 1235.
229. Id., see also I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988) (allowing the deduction of all "ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business").
230. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-36-003 (Sept. 7, 1990). The transaction involved a contract with
a relocation company to sell employees' houses for a fee that was adjusted upward or down-
ward to account for any loss or gain, respectively. Id. Title did not pass until the sale was
made. The IRS held that the transaction fell within the ambit of Rev. Rul. 82-204, even
though the form was more attenuated. Id. The holding focused on retention of risk/benefit
and application of substance over form but ignored whether an agency relation existed. Id.
Although the Technical Advice Memorandum is limited to its facts, it does leave open
other possibilities. For example, what if a corporation entered a contract to transfer title at
cost to a relocation service and paid a standard fee based on the value of the house, instead
of explicitly relating the gain or loss on the house back to the corporation? Of course, this
practice would deny the corporation the benefit of any gain.
Alternatively, as an analogy to certain insurance arrangements, consider an agreement
with such a service under which the service took title to the houses from the outset, sold
them at a gain or loss, and charged the corporation a fee for the service, but adjusted the fee
annually according to its gain or loss "experience." The corporation, then, would benefit
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The IRS's defeat may come from the one-versus-many argument
that it has used in previous real estate dealer cases.s31 To qualify
for the inventory exception, the property must be either typical
inventory or property held "primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course" of business.232 An employer should be able to sat-
isfy the "primarily" ' portion of the statute because its only inten-
tion in holding an employee's house is to resell it.
The "to customers" and "ordinary course" mandates, however,
may prove more troublesome. If the employer can convince the
court simply to follow the legislative intent in attaching these
words, the taxpayer seemingly still would prevail. Congress ap-
pended the language in 1934 solely to estop traders in securities
from asserting dealer status. 34 Attention to the statute, instead,
might prove fatal; it contains no language limiting application of
the words to securities traders.23 5 Considering the housing transac-
tion further, the employer has no "customers" in the conventional
sense and does not expect ordinary profits from the sale of employ-
ees' houses. The employer's purpose, then, would be specula-
tion-to minimize its losses-which certainly would warrant capi-
tal treatment.2 8
To come full circle, the big picture reveals that the employer
holds the house not for speculation, but for meeting the business
need of providing such "compensation" in order to attract quali-
fied employees.237 This last justification for ordinary treatment ap-
pears to make perfect sense in this case; however, the Court cut off
any such reasoning four years ago in its Arkansas Best decision,
indirectly from any gains, possibly even in the form of "rebates" that would also be
ordinary.
The beneficial part of either approach is that losses represented by fees would receive
ordinary treatment and therefore would not be limited under the capital loss provisions. See
I.R.C. § 1211.
231. See supra note 114 (describing the variability of classification of an asset in differing
hands and the factors influencing this variability).
232. I.R.C. § 1221(1).
233. In Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966), the Supreme Court defined "primarily" in
the context of I.R.C. § 1221(1) to mean " 'of first importance' or 'principally.' " Id. at 572.
234. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
235. See I.R.C. § 1221.
236. Sheppard, supra note 225, at 1237.
237. Consider a "but for" type analysis: the employer would not be buying and selling the
house but for its relation to providing the benefit to employees.
[Vol. 34:885
CAPITAL ASSET DEFINITION
which severely limited the effect of business motivation on tax
character determinations.23
Circle K Corp. v. United States
In Circle K Corp. v. United States,2 39 a convenience store chain
purchased stock in an oil development company 24 0 The majority of
its convenience stores sold gasoline, which comprised thirty-five
percent of its total sales.241 Although the substance of the stock
purchase was to guarantee a gasoline supply, Circle K on more
than one occasion represented the purchase in filings with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission as only an investment or as a
transaction primarily for investment.242 The company made this
representation chiefly to obtain available tax benefits.243 Ulti-
mately, plaintiff sold the stock after determining that the invest-
ment would not serve as a viable solution to its gasoline prob-
lem.244 Circle K claimed a $27,824,296 ordinary loss deduction
attributable to the sale.245 As a basis for its claim, the company
argued that the stock qualified under the first capital asset excep-
tion exempting "stock in trade or other property included
in the inventory of the taxpayer. '246
The Claims Court analyzed Circle K's claim according to Su-
preme Court holdings in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commis-
sioner247 and Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner 2 4 Recognizing
that under the expanded Corn Products doctrine, "ordinary asset
treatment" applied to all "assets acquired and sold for regular bus-
iness purposes," the Claims Court held that judicial determination
238. See supra notes 191-211 and accompanying text.
239. 23 Cl. Ct. 665 (1991).
240. Id. at 666-67.
241. Id. at 666.
242. Id. at 667.
243. Id. Oil and gas producers are allowed percentage depletion deductions from each
producing property, but the deduction is not available to gasoline retailers or to producers
who sell their product to owners of more than five percent of the producer's stock. I.R.C.
§ 613 (1988); Circle K, 23 Cl. Ct. at 667.
244. Circle K, 23 Cl. Ct. at 669.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing I.RC. § 1221(l)).
247. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
248. 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
1993]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
of motive was dispositive. 249 Next, the court noted that the Su-
preme Court m Arkansas Best had repudiated the motive test,
trimming the Corn Products holding to mean that only "hedging
transactions that are an integral part of a business' inventory-
purchase system" qualify for the inventory exception.2 50 Thus, af-
ter Arkansas Best, motive has no bearing;25 1 instead, the question
is whether the inventory item and the taxpayer's business are
closely connected. 52 Although Circle K at times professed that it
purchased its stock for other purposes, the court held that the
purchase qualified in substance as a hedging transaction, and the
loss was therefore ordinary 253 The "substance" argument was that
Circle K's controlling or influential ownership investment could
guarantee supply at a reasonable price in the event that market
prices became cost prohibitive.254
In light of Arkansas Best, the court arguably wrongly decided
Circle K. The Claims Court, in effect, wedged open the door for
using "purpose" testing to determine capital versus ordinary sta-
tus, a door that the Supreme Court had all but closed in Arkansas
Best.255 Nonetheless, the court's reasoning does mesh with Arkan-
sas Best in the sense that the taxpayer's motive is unimportant
except in establishing a surrogate for one of the statutory excep-
tions. The substitute for inventory in the case, however, was not a
249. Circle K, 23 Cl. Ct. at 670.
250. Id. at 671 (citing Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 217).
251. Id. at 672.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 673.
254. Id.
255. See Lee A. Sheppard, Circle K. How Taxpayer Choice Survives Arkansas Best, 51
TAX NOTES 1359, 1359-60 (1991). Although the Supreme Court did not say explicitly that
capital stock not in the hands of a dealer could not be ordinary, it did argue that to allow
the application of a business-motive test to stock would be to allow the taxpayer significant
influence over the asset's characterization. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S.
212, 222 (1988). The Court stated that "stock is most naturally viewed as a capital asset
[and] we are unaware of a single decision that has applied the business-motive test so as to
require a taxpayer to report a gain from the sale of stock as an ordinary gain." Id. at 222-23.
Ironically, Circle K involved a taxpayer seeking ordinary treatment for the sale of stock and
winning.
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commodity futures hedge, but the quintessential capital asset, cap-
ital stock.256
Addressing the underlying concern that a taxpayer might at-
tempt to recharacterize assets at or near the time of sale to benefit
himself most, commentators after Corn Products called for identi-
fication upon acquisition of an asset.257 Although the IRS did not
enact any such regulation, in litigating cases such as Circle K the
government nevertheless took the position that each taxpayer
should preidentify the purpose of its asset acquisition.25 s After
hearing the government's argument that Circle K had disavowed
any intent to utilize the stock purchase as a source of supply,259 the
court seemed to recognize the oddity of ignoring motive for one
purpose and effectively recognizing it for another. "[Such] evi-
dence to that effect is entirely irrelevant here Instead,
[we] must determine whether the stock purchase, solely on its face,
had a substantially close connection to plaintiff's inventory-
purchase system. 260
Admittedly, if the government had centered more of its efforts
on arguing the absence of a valid hedge,26 ' it may have persuaded
the court that the stock purchase at issue was not an inventory
256. This statement is not meant to imply that stock can never be an inventory hedge;
however, such a finding would be "starting over," considering the constraints that the Ar-
kansas Best decision placed on the Corn Products doctrine.
Cases such as Campbell Taggart, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing that overpriced stock purchased to maintain business reputation and subsequently sold
at a loss qualified for ordinary loss treatment) and Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States,
303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (holding that a taxpayer's stock "investment" to insure a supply
of newsprint vital to its business was ordinary in nature and qualified for ordinary loss
treatment upon disposition) are implicitly overruled by language in Arkansas Best. In fact,
the Court in Arkansas Best cited these cases as support for the former broad application of
Corn Products but immediately rebuked that broad application as having no statutory sup-
port. Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 216.
257. Sheppard, supra note 255, at 1360.
258. Circle K, 23 Cl. Ct. at 672; Sheppard, supra note 255, at 1360.
259. Circle K, 23 Cl. Ct. at 672.
260. Id.
261. A valid hedge meriting ordinary loss treatment arguably did not exist for two rea-
sons. First, the "hedge" was to obtain supply, not to ward against price fluctuations. Al-
though Corn Products would have recognized source of supply as an exception to the statu-
tory definition of capital assets, Arkansas Best effectively overruled such exceptions. See
Sheppard, supra note 255, at 1361; supra notes 195-200, 250-56 and accompanying text.
Second, considering the nature of a hedge as a legitimate guarantee to counterbalance fu-
ture uncertainty, a stock investment in a risky wildcat oil venture is certainly not a palpable
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substitute comporting with Arkansas Best. Indeed, even given this
Note's recommendations,262 Circle K is a poor decision on the mer-
its. Characterizing a purely uncertain investment as an attempt to
secure a future inventory is illogical.2 63
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE
Reconciling the Cases
From a broad definitional standpoint, AzarNut and Circle K
are reconcilable on one obvious point: the courts have consistently
been deferential to taxpayer treatment of assets related to inven-
tory, but not to treatment based on equally valid business circum-
stances unrelated to inventory 264
solution given many, much safer means of insuring supply. Sheppard, supra note 255, at
1361.
262. See infra notes 264-74 and accompanying text.
263. Of course, a business may take whatever risks it determines worthwhile in its judg-
ment. However, for tax purposes, the goal of some reciprocal fairness between the taxpayer
and the government would dictate the need of some guidelines in such instances. In Circle
K, a purely chance venture, an investment in a wildcat oil venture (even when coupled with
the importance of gasoline to the company), a prior history of shortages, and the assertion
of a hedge, should not rise to a determination of ordinary asset treatment under any analy-
sis. Recognizing such attenuated positions would allow the taxpayer to assert that almost
any investment with a relation to its business is an inventory hedge or business necessity.
See supra notes 189-90.
264. The statutory inventory exception of course may be the general reason for these out-
comes. However, § 162, the stalwart business-expense provision, has apparently been ig-
nored. See I.R.C. § 162 (1988) (providing deductibility for all "ordinary and necessary" busi-
ness expenses).
In a sense, the courts have come full circle as illustrated by a comparison between pre-
Corn Products decisions. In Exposition Souvenir Corp. v. Commissioner, 163 F.2d 283 (2d
Cir. 1947), a company was required to buy World's Fair bonds to operate a souvenir conces-
sion stand at the Fair. Id. at 284. Agreeing that the motivation was purely business oriented,
but finding no statutory exclusion, the court denied ordinary loss treatment. Id. at 285-86. A
second case also dealt with purchase of securities for a business reason, but this reason was
related to inventory needs. In Western Wine & Liquor Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 1090
(1952), acq., 1958-1 C.B. 6, acq. appeal dismissed, 205 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1953), a whiskey
wholesaler purchased stock in a distilling company to offset whiskey shortages in the mar-
ket. Id. at 1092. The tax court found that the purchase was incident to the company's busi-
ness but allowed ordinary loss treatment. Id. at 1099. Although both courts classified the
motive driving the purchase as business purposes, the clear distinction was the latter's in-
ventory relation.
These cases are analogous to Corn Products and Arkansas Best. The Supreme Court in
Corn Products recognized the business purpose behind an inventory-related asset purchase.
Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 50 (1955). Of course, the significance of
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The Court in Corn Products was attempting to recognize, as best
it could, the true meaning of capital asset.26 5 Its attempt generally
comports with both early notions of the meaning of capital assets
at the inception of our tax laws and the more academic economic
theories. The Arkansas Best decision represented the Court's con-
cern that judicial decisions might go too far beyond the statute,
supported by little more than unbounded conjecture. The Court's
solution was to return to the statute.
The Claims Court at least believed that Arkansas Best left open
the possibility that stock purchases closely tied to inventory needs
could be ordinary transactions.2 66 Whether the Supreme Court in-
tended to allow this result is uncertain, but clearly the Court in
Arkansas Best did not approve of the possibility for taxpayer and
IRS manipulation that Corn Products allowed.267 Therefore, the
Court chose not to use its interpretive powers to support a depar-
ture from the statute.
A common acceptance of Arkansas Best states that although the
Court "side-stepped its role in the law making process and
[went] against its own tradition of interpreting the laws to fur-
ther the intent of Congress," it justifiably did so to "narrow[] the
this case rests in its precedential value and its language framing the holding in terms of
business motive. The emphasis on business purpose was so strong that the Corn Products
doctrine resulted in 33 years of subjectively determined cases based on the asset's purpose.
Arkansas Best represented the retreat from Western Wine thinking to Exposition Souvenir
reasoning.
265. For example, in Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966), the Court stated that the
purpose of the inventory exception was "to differentiate between the 'profits and losses aris-
ing from the everyday operation of a business' and 'the realization of appreciation in
value accrued over a substantial period of time.' " Id. at 572 (citations omitted) (quoting
Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 52; Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130,
134 (1960)).
266. The Court in Arkansas Best did not specifically foreclose this possibility, but it did
affirm the Eighth Circuit Court, which stated:
We do not read Corn Products as either requiring or permitting the courts to
decide that capital stock can be anything other than a capital asset under sec-
tion 1221. Corn Products and its progeny [are] misbegotten [and
have led] to increased recourse to the administrative and judicial
processes to resolve conflicting contentions about taxpayers' motivations in
purchasing capital stock.
Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 215, 221 (8th Cir. 1986), afl'd, 485 U.S. 212
(1988).
267. Maria E. O'Neill, Note, Arkansas Best Corporation v. Commissioner-The Demise of
the Corn Products Doctrine?, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1481, 1490 (1989).
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range of litigable issues. ' '268 Ironically, an earlier Supreme Courttouted the motive test as workable and providing certainty 269
A Sixth Exception
One conclusion is inescapable: Congress is overdue in exercising
its "necessary and proper"2 7° power in this area. The courts clearly
have been troubled by common principles of economics as applied
to the current statutory definition of capital assets. Their uncer-
tainty is justified because the statute is structured inversely and
fails to account for economic realities.
Perhaps Congress has failed to act for reasons that were the
cause of the statute's current structure. Both capital and ordinary
assets are innumerable and the character of a given asset is not
fixed; therefore, a workable statutory definition, whether inclusive
or exclusive, is difficult to construct. Because the nature of the
property itself is at issue, its economic substance should be the
most important definitional concern.
One possible solution would be to leave the definition in its cur-
rent state-explicitly recognizing "everyday" ordinary asset exclu-
sions-and append a sixth exclusion. This addition necessarily
would be variable in nature to recognize both the realities of a
complex economic system and the economic essence of the capital
asset. The effect would be to mitigate judicial manipulation of the
current definition.
Of course, the administrative fears must be addressed. Adoption
of a form of predetermination could solve, as has been proposed in
the past, the burden of analyzing taxpayers' motives under the
sixth exception. The form of predetermination would have to pro-
268. M. Kevin Bryant, Comment, The Corn Products Doctrine After Arkansas Best, 14
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 131, 157 (1989). But see Shrader, supra note 21, at 420 (concluding
that although Arkansas Best may have reduced complexity, it frustrated general tax policy
treatment of ordinary business operations and denial of preferences to property related to
normal business income).
269. United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 104 (1972) (stating that the motivation test
has "the attribute of workability" and provides "a guideline of certainty"); see also Shrader,
supra note 21, at 366-69 (arguing against the wisdom of Arkansas Best); cf. Arkansas Best,
485 U.S. at 222-23 (speaking of the taxpayer's significant influence in determining the char-
acter of an asset under a motive test).
270. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing that "Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes" and "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" to execute such power).
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vide an opportunity for scrutiny by the IRS before the "sell or ex-
change" transaction.
A test similar to that expounded in Booth Newspapers, Inc. v.
United States217 is perhaps descriptive of this proposal. The court
in Booth stated the "business motive test" as follows:
[I]f securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integral and
necessary act in the conduct of his business, and continue to be
so held until the time of their sale, any loss incurred as a result
thereof may be fully deducted from gross income as a business
expense or ordinary loss. If, on the other hand, an investment
purpose be found to have motivated the purchase or holding of
the securities, any loss realized upon their ultimate disposition
must be treated in accord with the capital asset provisions of the
Code.272
Both the government and the taxpayer could use such a test to
evaluate any assets that might fall within the sixth exception. A
taxpayer wishing to assert this new exclusion from the capital asset
"presumption" would file with the IRS a statement of its position
upon acquisition or upon changed circumstances thereafter. 73 The
271. 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
272. Id. at 921; see O'Neill, supra note 267, at 1486. A similar test adopted by the Tax
Court in W W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d
43 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977), provided that, in the case of stock, the exis-
tence of a substantial investment motive (SIM) resulted in capital asset classification not-
withstanding a coexisting or overriding business purpose. Id. at 712. This test recognizes
instances that involve "mixed" motives. On its face, the test appears equitable because any
significant investment motive legitimately could be considered to taint the classification of
an asset. The problem apparent upon practical analysis, however, is that the test seems to
be a breeding ground of argument between the IRS and the taxpayer. The parties might
argue for example, over what is "significant" and how the subjective nature of motive might
be resolved. This Note's proposal would remedy such problems.
The IRS indicated that it would follow the SIM test in Rev. Rul. 78-94, 1978-1 C.B. 58,
but suspended this ruling in I.R.S. Notice 87-68, 1987-2 C.B. 378, just prior to the Arkansas
Best decision.
One reason cited for favoring the SIM test over the business-motive test is that the latter
is too susceptible to taxpayer manipulation. O'Neill, supra note 267, at 1486. The same
criticism, however, is readily apparent in the SIM test. Particularly with regard to stock, the
IRS could attempt to deny ordinary treatment at will by asserting a substantial investment
motive.
273. In 1976, both Houses of Congress passed similar bills but did not enact them; the
proposed procedures required the taxpayer acquiring securities to notify the IRS if he con-
templated ordinary treatment. H.R. 10902, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); see also 122 CONG.
REc. 27,499, 34,589 (1976) (discussing H.R. 10902).
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IRS would then either acquiesce or deny the petition, in which
case the taxpayer would be afforded an appeal. 4 If the petition
were successful, the status would remain in effect while in the tax-
payer's hands, absent a compelling change in circumstances. Such
a compelling change might effect a change in status and would be
reviewed by the Service. Again, an appeal would be provided to the
taxpayer.
Although costs of administering the sixth exception might be
significant at the IRS/taxpayer level, a commensurate savings at
the judiciary level should result and offset those costs. More im-
portantly, the capital assets' economic substance would be re-
stored. Furthermore, given a statutory provision intended to be
subject to "facts and circumstances," Treasury regulations provid-
ing examples and guidance as to indicia of business versus invest-
ment purposes, followed by judicial development of a consistent
body of precedent, would soon provide certainty as well.
CONCLUSION
In choosing the statutory form of the capital asset definition,
Congress long ago fashioned the infamous "inverted" definition by
exception. The awkward form appears objectionable at first, but
becomes more sensible upon realizing that no finite list of capital
assets is possible or that no tell-tale description absolutely deline-
ates the possibilities. The language, in fact, serves well to truncate
those most basic ordinary assets from capital characterization.
The problem, however, is that the definition describes only lit-
eral "exceptions," while commercial and economic realities demand
a definition capable of recognizing the characteristic economic na-
ture and use of an asset at a point in time. Economic substance
and state are not fixed; instead, they are indicated by the asset's
position in the economic chain, the operations of the asset holder,
and the actual or intended use of the asset. The historical origins
Other proposals in the nature of taxpayer elections surfaced after Corn Products. See,
e.g., Note, Judicial Treatment of Capital Assets Acquired for Business: The New Criterion,
65 YALE L.J. 401 (1956).
274. The appeal would be within the IRS. To prevent one-sided IRS denials from defeat-
ing the provision, however, the taxpayer would still be able to resort to the courts once the
recognition transaction had been reported, based on the facts and circumstances. Acquies-
cence by the IRS would always serve as a safe harbor for the taxpayer.
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of income classification and economic principles that guide the dis-
tinction between capital and ordinary assets, however, are rela-
tively fixed and thereby allow for economically substantive, pre-
dictable determinations of asset characterization.
The courts nevertheless have been in a quandary over such de-
terminations for nearly a century Some read intent and economic
reality into the present statute and others, offended by judicial leg-
islating and fearful of overly broad interpretations, interpreted the
statute narrowly They have left the taxpayer unable to ascertain
the nature of his assets and predict the tax consequences of certain
transactions. Congress must respond to the statute's failure to rec-
ognize economic realities and provide a statutory definition that
accommodates the intrinsic economic basis of the capital asset.
The present statute's listing of fundamental capital asset excep-
tions should be maintained given their presumptively ordinary
character; an additional provision allowing taxpayer declaration
of ordinary character based on the "facts and circum-
stances"-subject to IRS scrutiny and ultimately to judicial re-
view-will encourage more proper economic characterization. Ad-
ding mindful variability to the definition will also quell the
sometimes mindless variability of the courts' past decisions.
Joseph Byron Cartee
1993]
